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Abstract 
Research on human interaction has shown that attributing agency to another agent has substantial 
consequences for the way we perceive and evaluate its actions. Specifically, considering an agent’s actions 
related to either effort or ability can have important consequences for the attribution of responsibility. This 
study indicates that participants’ interpretation of a robot failure in terms of effort –as opposed to ability– 
significantly increases their attribution of agency and –to some extent– moral responsibility to the robot. 
However a robot displaying lack of effort does not lead to the level of affective and behavioural reactions 
of participants normally found in reactions to other human agents.   
1 Introduction 
Currently, much debate is devoted to the question of how we should deal with harm caused by robots. 
Research on anthropomorphism, blame and examples of media and pop culture speaking of ‘robot laws’ 
underline the possibility of humans –perhaps inappropriately– attributing moral responsibility to 
automated systems. Although legal solutions have been proposed for dealing with such conflicts [1], in 
daily life this may still have undesired implications. Owners and developers of robots may (unknowingly) 
distance themselves from potential harms caused by their robots, causing responsibility to become 
diffused. Therefore, it is relevant to find out what factors contribute to the attribution of agency and 
responsibility in robots.   
Extensive work on attributional processes in human interaction reveals that the perception of an 
agent’s effort and abilities are central determinants in the attribution of agency and moral responsibility 
[2]. This, in turn, is strongly related to fundamental affective and behavioural reactions such as sympathy, 
rejection, altruism and aggression [2, 3]. Yet, with regard to human robot interaction (HRI), little is 
known about the attribution of agency and moral responsibility.  
In this study, we applied Weiner’s Theory of Social Conduct [2] to HRI by showing participants 
videos of robots (Aldebaran’s NAO) failing tasks in ways that could be interpreted as due to either lack of 
ability (LA-condition; e.g. dropping an object) or lack of effort (LE-condition; e.g. throwing away an 
object). We expected that a display of lack of effort would incite the illusion of a robot having agency 
over its actions. In addition, we expected that a robot’s lack of effort would have little effect on the 
attribution of moral responsibility to the robot, compared to a display of lack of ability.  
2 Method 
In an online survey, sixty-three participants (MAge = 25,5, SD = 9,7; drawn from a university population) 
were shown a video of about 30-60 seconds portraying a situation in which a NAO robot was shown  
failing a task either due to lack of ability or lack of effort. Seven of such scenarios were presented2. After 
each video, participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire containing scales of agency (five questions 
about the robot’s control over the situation and its ability to make its own decisions), and responsibility  
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(twelve questions on attributed blame and kindness, affective and behavioural reactions). Additionally, 
scales were included measuring the participant’s estimate of the robot’s experience (e.g. having beliefs, 
desires, intentions, emotions), predictability, propensity to do damage, trustworthiness and 
nonanthropomorphic features (e.g. strength, efficiency, usefulness)3.  
For analysis, mean scores of each scale (range 1-5) were calculated and transposed to Z-scores. Since 
reliability and goodness-of-fit for the scale of responsibility was questionable, items of this scale were 
analyzed separately. In order to answer our main questions, a GLM multivariate analysis was performed 
with the composite means of agency, experience, predictability, propensity to do damage, and each item 
related to responsibility as dependent variables. Condition (LA/LE) was indicated as between-subject 
factor.  
3 Results 
According to what was expected, participants attributed more 
agency to a NAO robot after seeing videos in which it displayed 
lack of effort (M = 2.80, SD = 0.82) compared to videos in which it 
displayed lack of ability (M = 2.12, SD = 0.61). Univariate tests 
expressed significant and large effects for the composite scores of 
agency (F(1,61) = 13.601, p = .000, eta2 = .182), experience 
(F(1,61) = 12.235, p = .001, eta2 = .168), and predictability 
(F(1,61) = 14.040, p = .000, eta2 = .187). The results for the items 
of responsibility were mixed. While univariate tests for blame and 
disappointment revealed significant, medium effects (respectively: 
F(1, 61) = 5.757, p = .019, eta2 =  .086; F(1, 61) = 9.704, p = .003, 
eta2 = .137), effects for the items anger, put away, sell, kindness, 
pity, sympathy, help and try again were not significant.  
4 Conclusion 
Similar to findings related to human interaction, the results of our study reveal that, in case of robots 
displaying behaviour that can be interpreted as lack of effort, humans tend to explain robotic behaviour by 
attributing agency. In case of failure, a robot displaying lack of effort  -essentially refraining from 
‘trying’- may lead to blame and disappointment. However, it does not necessarily lead to negative 
affective and behavioural reactions such as anger, or wanting to shut the robot off and put it away. Results 
like these emphasize that we should be aware of potential diffusion of human responsibility when 
(advanced) robots create the impression that they are agents in the sense of actually controlling and 
intending their own actions. Our results also suggest that –in case of NAO robots- failure, or even 
reluctance for doing tasks is received well, illustrating a promisingly positive view on robots.  
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Fig. 1: Difference scores of means within the lack of ability  
and lack of effort (LA - LE) conditions.   
223
BNAIC 2016
